The Predictioneer's Game: Using the Logic of Brazen Self-Interest to See and Shape the Future

I have really mixed feelings about this book. I began reading it with high expectations. I was already fairly familiar with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's work, and his unconventional and somewhat controversial methods. Bueno de Mesquita (in graduate school we referred to him as "BDM" for short) is a relatively famous political scientist (famous enough to have been interviewed by Jon Stewart on "The Daily Show") who takes a "rational choice" approach to the study of political phenomena. In other words, BDM uses game theory, expected utility theory, prospect theory, and other similar quantitative methods borrowed from economics to model political behavior much in the same way that economists model economic behavior. I've been intrigued by BDM's methods ever since I first encountered his work in grad school. Like most political scientists, I was initially rather skeptical of BDM's approach to modeling and predicting political phenomena -- and I'm still not convinced that the underlying assumptions behind his models of political decision making are entirely correct -- but the success of his models at accurately predicting world events is hard to deny. He must be doing something right.Anyway, I've always wanted to learn more about BDM's methods, and to be able to explain those methods to my own students as clearly and concisely as possible, without oversimplifying the complexity of what his models do, or glossing over important details about how they work. I was hoping this book would do just that. In fact, I was hoping this book would be suitable for use in some of my upper-level courses, where I discuss various methods for studying political phenomena such as the causes of war. Unfortunately, the book just didn't quite live up to my hopes or expectations.The problem has nothing to do with BDM's methods -- which I find intriguing and worthy of serious consideration. The problem is simply that this book doesn't really get into the "meat" of those methods as much as I was hoping it would. I found the treatment far too superficial. The book reads more like a sales brochure than an operator's manual. It tells you what sort of things BDM's models can do. It recounts several anecdotes about how BDM has used these models, both in his scholarly research and in his work as a consultant for government and business. It explains, in very general terms, the underlying logic behind BDM's methods. It makes a case for why it makes good sense for scholars, analysts, and decision makers to rely on predictive models of the sort that BDM has developed. But it doesn't really explain, in a clear, concise, step-by-step way, exactly how these models work to generate their predictions about the future, or how someone would go about setting up and running a predictive model using BDM's methods. Sure, it gives hints here and there. And if you carefully read the entire book, including the appendices, you can piece together enough information from the various illustrations and anecdotes to figure out how to craft a fairly simple, back-of-the-envelope predictive model that will give you a crude prediction of the most likely outcome of a decision process. But nowhere in the book does BDM provide step-by-step instructions for how to build a predictive model and how to use it. There are no formulas, no flow charts, no computer code, no explicit instructions for exactly how to get the predictions you want from the information you have. The lack of explicit instructions for how to build and use the sort of predictive models that BDM has developed is the single biggest weakness of this book.BDM discusses his method of "predictioneering" mainly by relating a series of anecdotes about work he has done over the years as a scholar and as a consultant. Each anecdote illustrates some specific aspect of the methods he uses to predict -- and in some cases to influence or manipulate -- the outcomes of various decision processes. Although some of these anecdotes were interesting in their own right, and they did serve to illustrate the points BDM was trying to make, I found myself quickly growing bored and frustrated with this approach. Trying to understand BDM's methods by reading this book is akin to trying to piece together a jigsaw puzzle as someone hands you one piece at a time, and insists on telling you a story about each piece before letting you have the next one. After a while, I just wanted to scream: "Enough with the stories already! Just give me all the pieces and show me how to put them together!" This book is, for the most part, a collection of stories about the individual pieces of the puzzle. It never quite gets around to putting all the pieces together (at least not to my satisfaction).This review has largely been negative; but only because the book failed to live up to my rather high hopes and expectations. I don't want to leave the (false) impression that this book isn't worth reading (I gave it a "four star" rating, after all). There are some very valuable insights here, especially for those readers who may not be at all familiar with BDM's work. I'm certainly glad I read this book; and I enjoyed many parts of it -- especially the final three chapters, where BDM uses his method to shed some light on historical events and to make a few predictions about the likely outcome of a handful of important current events. But, as a political science professor evaluating this book for potential classroom use, I feel that it falls short of what I'm looking for. It gives the reader a taste of what BDM's methods can do; but it doesn't really teach the reader how to use those methods. For the lay reader who is simply curious about how it may be possible to use computer models to predict, and even influence, the future, that may be sufficient. But for students who want to learn to build their own predictive models, it is not.

Book was in perfect shape!

In a cover article several years ago, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita was featured as "The New Nostrodamus." Bueno de Mesquita is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution who has consulted for the CIA, the U.S. Department of Defense and multiple Fortune 500 companies. He's also not shy about discussing his 90% accuracy rate.Bueno de Mesquita's first significant success came in forecasting the prime minister of India in the late 1970's. While Jagjivan Ram was the public favorite, his models suggested that not only would Charan Singh win the prime ministry, but that the new Indian government would be incapable of governing and would fail shortly thereafter.His methodology relies heavily on game theory, a form of mathematical optimization that looks at the payoffs between multiple strategies and participants. In participating in any given game, each player positions himself to obtain the highest personal benefit. From this perspective, all players are predictability self-interested and rational. While game theory was originally applied to economic problems in the 1950's by John Nash, Bueno de Mesquita shows how this discipline can be applied to a broad range of issues including elections, corporate succession, public policy, and diplomacy.One of the more frustrating elements of the book is that the author seems reluctant to share all of his secrets. He gives you conclusions, while seldom revealing the formulae that he uses to calculate them. Those looking for more details would benefit from reading one of his earlier works, Predicting Politics.Bueno de Mesquita's system for determining outcomes of political elections involves estimating blended values for political influence, salience, and position. These three factors appear are important to his method of determining outcomes. He also appears to use a similar methodology in looking at relative negotiating strength within complex litigations. Higher negotiating strength represents better positioning within a spectrum of possible outcomes.Beyond simply predicting the future, the book also offers some good ideas for encouraging cooperation on a diplomatic level by using better incentives. As an example, one solution that he suggests to the problem of negotiating peace between the Isreali and Palestinian governments would be to provide a sharing arrangement on tax revenues generated from tourism. Greater revenues are only possible with greater peace. This would be a self-enforcing solution that requires relatively little cooperation or trust between either group.The Predictioneer's Game offers an insider's view of global issues and is peppered with interesting insights. Bueno de Mesquita also indulges in periodic self-promotion and this can be a bit of a distraction. However, there is enough of interest and substance here to suggest that game theoretic models can and should be a part of the futurist toolbox -- especially for problems involving negotiation and political outcomes.

It's an article strung out as a book. Self-promoting without divulging how he successfully predicts events, probably because he wants to retain the IP which is understandable but leaves you feeling short-changed.Blurb on the back cover states "Full of stimulating examples and clear explanations". Utter tosh.

Anyone with a name as colourful as Bruce Bueno de Mesquita has to be interesting. He is that - however on the other hand - I expected more from the book. He writes well but parts of the book got a bit bogged down and there wasn't enough pzzazz overall.But I enjoyed it none the less...Michael - Montréal Canada

Lectura fácil y rapida, aunque en ingles... nunca lo he visto en español. Guía rápida sobre La Teoría de Juegos y como aplicarla

Great anecdotal introduction to game theory. Easy to read. I thought the stories about the power of de Mesquita's analysis were reasonably balanced by the limitations.

Eigentlich ein Widerspruch. Mathematik ist streng logisch. Politik und überhaupt das menschliche Leben sind nicht logisch. Zumindestens handeln die meisten Menschen nicht nach den Gesetzen der Logik, so wie sich Mathematiker und auch viele Naturwissenschafler diese vorstellen. Dennoch sind die Handlungen von Menschen oft vorhersagbar. Genau diese Tatsache macht sich die Spieltheorie zu Nutze, wenn sie das Ergebnis der Verhandlungen zwischen vielen Personen, von denen jede ein bekanntes Verhaltensmuster besitzt, mit Hilfe mathematischer Methoden vorhersagt. Solche Verhandlungen ( Spiele ) kommen in Politik, Wirtschaft und Justiz häufig vor. Hier genau hat die Theorie einen enormen Nutz- und Erkenntniswert. Das Buch beschreibt ihre Anwendung mit vielen, teilweise frappierenden Beispielen aus den bereits genannten Anwendungsgebieten.Bruce Bueno de Mesquita ist auf diesem Gebiet Praktiker, d.h. er hat viele reale politische Ereignisse korrekt vorhergesagt. Auch im Bereich von Gerichtsverfahren und in der Wirtschaft war er erfolgreich als Berater tätig, indem er spieltheoretische Methoden anwandte.Das ganze ist keine Lektüre zum Wohlfühlen, da die Verhaltensmuster, mit denen die Spieltheorie arbeitet, in erster Linie schierer Egoismus und krasse Egomanie ( letztere vor allem bei Politikern und Managern ) sind. Sie beschreibt mit mathematischen Methoden eine Welt, die sich meisten Menschen, wenn sie die Wahl gehabt hätten, so nicht ausgesucht hätten. Deswegen stellt sich auch die Frage nach dem Mißbrauch dieser Theorie, z.B. durch "böse" Diktatoren. Auch darauf geht das Buch ein. Es bietet also viel Stoff zum Lesen, Nachdenken und Grübeln.